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Comments
THE ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE DOCTRINE IN LOUISIANA
In the English feudal days a man's home could in fact be his
castle and not even the King could enter without permission. The
only duty owed by a landowner to unauthorized persons on his
land was that of not intentionally injuring them after he discov-
ered them.' However, as social and economic adjustments were
made, a feeling arose that such a rule was too harsh, that a tres-
1. Peaslee, Duty to Seen Trespassers (1914) 27 Harv. L. Rev. 403; Prosser,
A Handbook on the Law of Torts (1941) 613.
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passer was not a criminal whom the law would not protect. As a
result, inroads were made on this immunity of the landowner.2
The trend began in the early English spring-gun3 and baited-trap
cases, 4 in which the possessor of land was liable for injury that
was deliberately planned in anticipation of a trespass. Later,
landowners were required to use reasonable care toward tres-
passers actually discovered upon their lands.5 But the most ex-
tensive and controversial restriction of the landowner's immu-
nity has taken place in situations in which the trespassers have
been children."
The leading American case of Sioux City Railway Company
v. Stout,7 in 1873, involved the maintenance of an unlocked turn-
table on a railroad right of way. A young child played with and
was injured by the turntable. In allowing recovery, the court
assumed that the railroad owed a duty of care toward the tres-
passing child. It based the railroad's liability upon the foresee-
ability of injury to the child.
Most American courts were unwilling, however, to impose
on the landowner the broad duty to use reasonable care toward
trespassing children." It was assumed that a sympathetic jury
could not be depended upon to administer such situations with
fairness to the landowner. In their search for some approach
whereby the judges could maintain more control over such dis-
putes, the courts evolved the "attractive nuisance" doctrine.9
The doctrine exists in almost as many variations as there are
courts announcing it. But, in general, the fact that the presence
2. A good review of this development is found in Eldredge, Tort Liability
to Trespassers (1937) 12 Temp. L. Q. 32, and Prosser, op. cit. supra note 1,
at 609-625.
3. Bird v. Holbrook, 4 Bing. 628, 130 Eng. Reprint 911 (C.P. 1828).
4. Townsend v. Wathen, 9 East. 277, 103 Eng. Reprint 579 (K.B. 1808).
5. Restatement, Torts (1934) § 336; Green, Landowner v. Intruder (1923)
21 Mich. L. Rev. 495; Peaslee, supra note 1.
6. Some of the leading articles on the subject are Bohlen, The Duty of a
Landowner Towards Those Entering His Premises of Their Own Right
(1921) 69 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 340, 347-350; Eldredge, supra note 2; Green, Land-
owner v. Intruder (1923) 21 Mich. L. Rev. 495; Green, Landowners' Respon-
sibility to Children (1948) 27 Tex. L. Rev. 1; Hudson, The Turntable Cases
in the Federal Courts (1923) 36 Harv. L. Rev. 826; Smith, Liability of Land-
owners to Children Entering Without Permission (1898) 11 Harv. L. Rev.
349, 434. See also Prosser, op. cit. supra note 1, at 617-625; Restatement,
Torts (1934) § 339; Note (1926) 14 Ky. L.J. 176; Note (1928) 7 Tex. L. Rev.
173; Note (1934) 34 Col. L. Rev. 782.
7. 84 U. S. 657, 21 L. Ed. 745 (1873).
8. Green, Landowner v. Intruder (1923) 21 Mich. L. Rev. 495, 507.
9. See articles cited in note 6, supra, and Restatement, Torts (1934) §
339; Notes (1925) 36 A.L.R. 34, (1925) 39 A.L.R. 486, (1926) 45 A.L.R. 982,
(1928) 53 A.L.R. 1344, (1929) 60 A.L.R. 1444, (1944) 152 A.L.R. 1263.
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of young children can be expected in certain places imposes a
duty on the property owner to exercise due care for their safety
with respect to certain artificial conditions or dangerous activities
on the land. 10
The courts which adopt the doctrine adhere to the old com-
mon law immunity of the landowner to trespassers. But they are
prepared to admit that under certain circumstances the infant
trespasser may be elevated to the status of a licensee" or invitee 2
through the use of the legal fictions of "implied invitations," "im-
plied licenses," "allurements," "enticements," or "tacit permis-
sion.' 3 The court decides, as a matter of law, whether such
implied permission exists and, therefore, whether the doctrine is
applicable.
Even these measures of jury control have not satisfied all
courts, and additional restraints have been imposed. For ex-
ample, some courts have limited the doctrine to "artificial condi-
tion (s) . . . -inherently dangerous to children," "hidden dangers,"
or "concealed traps,' 1 4 or have restricted the attractive nuisance
doctrine to instances in which the child was attracted to the dan-
gerous object before it became a trespasser.15
Several courts, principally in industrial states, have entirely
rejected the doctrine. 6 They find no greater duty owed by the
10. Note (1939) 14 Ind. L.J. 376 and cases cited therein.
11. Toward the licensee, the occupier of land has no duty to see that the
premises are safe, but he is bound not to create a trap or to allow a concealed
danger to exist upon the premises, which is not apparent to the visitor, but
which is known or should be known to the occupier. Robert Addie & Sons
(Colleries) Limited v. Dumbreck [1929] A.C. 358; Prosser, op. cit. supra note
1, at 625; Restatement, Torts (1934) § 342.
12. A landowner has a duty to an invitee of taking reasonable care that
the premises are safe or of warning the visitor of the dangerous activities
or conditions of which the occupier knows or reasonably should know. Robert
Addie & Sons (Colleries) Limited v. Dumbreck [1929] A.C. 358; Prosser, op.
cit. supra note 1, at 635; Restatement, Torts (1934) § 343.
13. United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Britt, 258 U. S. 268, 42 S. Ct. 299, 66
L. Ed. 615, 36 A.L.R. 28 (1922); Keefe v. Milwaukee & St. P. Ry., 21 Minn.
207, 18 Am. Rep. 393 (1875); Prosser, op. cit. supra note 1, at 618 and cases
cited therein; Bohlen, supra note 6, at 348, n. 16; Note (1934) 29 Ill. L. Rev.
253. See also Bottum's Adm'r v. Hawks, 84 Vt. 370, 79 Atl. 858, 35 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 440, Ann. Cas. 1913A 1025 (1911) for a good discussion of these legal
theories.
14. 45 C.J. 763, 765, 771; 20 R.C.L. 86, § 76.
15. United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Britt, 258 U. S. 268, 42 S. Ct. 299, 66
L.Ed. 615, 36 A.L.R. 28 (1921); Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n.
v. Compton, 39 Ariz. 491, 8 P. (2d) 249 (1932); same case, 40 Ariz. 282, 11 P.
(2d) 839 (1932), noted in (1932) 27 Ill. L. Rev. 459; Lone Star Gas Co. v. Par-
sons, 159 Okla. 52, 14 P.(2d) 369 (1932), noted in (1932) 31 Mich. L. Rev. 439.
See also Notes (1922) 36 Harv. L. Rev. 113, 350, (1923) 17 Ill. L. Rev. 612,
(1929) 24 Ill. L. Rev. 248, and articles cited in note 6, supra.
16. See Prosser, op. cit. supra note 1, at 620, and cases cited therein.
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landowner to trespassing children than to adults in the same
situation.
In the first Louisiana case involving injury to a trespassing
child,17 the supreme court adopted the broad language of the
Stout case.' 8 However, the Louisiana courts soon reverted to the
use of all the legal fictions currently employed to limit the duty
owed infant intruders by the landowners. 19
The language of the Louisiana cases imposing or denying
recovery under the attractive nuisance doctrine is not always
consistent. But throughout the cases involving trespasses upon
land20 can be seen certain factors, circumstances, and considera-
17. Reary v. Louisville, N. 0. & Tex. Ry., 40 La. Ann. 32, 3 So. 390, 8 Am.
St. Rep. 497 (1888).
18. 84 U. S. 657, 21 L.Ed. 745 (1873).
19. For example, in O'Connor v. Illinois Central Ry., 44 La.. Ann. 339, 10
So. 678 (1892), the condition of defendant's fence did not operate as an
"invitation or procurement, express or implied"; in Savage v. Tremont Lum-
ber Co., 3 La. App. 704 (1926), a railroad flat car did not amount to a "trap";
in Peters v. Town of Ruston, 167 So. 491 (La. App. 1936), a pond was not
"peculiarly alluring" to children; in McDonald v. Shreveport Rys., 174 La.
1023, 142 So. 252 (1932), electrical wires were not an "invitation" to children
to use them; and in the dictum in Schultz v. Kinabrew, 177 So. 450 (La. App.
1937), the court said that the "attractiveness amounts to an implied invita-
tion to such children."
The attractive nuisance doctrine was developed because judges feared
that juries would be too lenient in allowing recovery against deep-pocketed
landowners under negligence principles. Query: In view of the virtual non-
use of juries in civil cases in Louisiana courts and the right of review of the
facts by appellate courts in all civil cases, would it not be more expedient
to base the liability of the landowner toward trespassing children on simple
negligence theories, as in the Stout case? Sde Green, Landowner v. Intruder
(1923) 21 Mich. L. Rev. 495, and Green, Landowners' Responsibility to Chil-
dren (1948) 27 Tex. L. Rev. 1, for a compelling argument, which has special
application in Louisiana, for a return to the doctrine of the Stout case.
Also, note the language of the Louisiana Supreme Court in the recent case
of Saxton v. Plum Orchards, Inc., 215 La. 378, 40 So. (2d) 791 (1949). Although
the attractive nuisance doctrine was applied in allowing recovery, the legal
fictions discussed above seemingly were not relied on.
20. This comment is restricted to cases involving trespasses upon land,
At times, the Louisiana courts, as have the courts of many other jurisdictions,
have extended the attractive nuisance doctrine to dangerous objects and
conditions in public streets and places, by analogy to cases involving tres-
passes upon land. The doctrine was developed to overcome the traditional
immunity that the English landowners enjoyed against unauthorized in-
truders without placing the landowner's duty on the basis of negligence. It is
doubtful that such immunity was ever extended to owners of chattels left in
public places (Pollock, Law of Torts [Landon's 14 ed., 1939) 280). It would
appear that these cases could be handled more easily under simple negli-
gence principles, with the meddling of the child as an element of con-
tributory negligence. Compare the leading English case of Lynch v. Nurdin,
1 Q.B. 29, 41 E.C.L. 422, 113 Eng. Reprint 1041, 1 Ad. & E. (N.S.) 29 (1841),
with the leading Louisiana case of Westerfield v. Levis Brothers, 43 La. Ann.
63, 9 So. 52 (1891), both involving vehicles left on public streets, and in both
of which a duty to the meddling child was assumed. In each case, the prin-
ciple question was the child's contributory negligence. In Lopes v. Sahugue,
114 La. 1004, 38 So. 810 (1905) (delivery cart); Palermo v. Orleans Ice Mfg.
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tions which have influenced the courts to impose or deny liability
under the doctrine. Perhaps in no case can it be said that any
single factor was controlling. The problem has been to strike a
balance between those considerations that suggest recovery and
those that do not. The cases indicate that recovery is condi-
tioned upon the presence of the following factors:
(1) The danger must be great and one not usually encoun-
tered in the ordinary uses of land.
Recovery has never been allowed under the attractive nui-
sance doctrine for injuries caused by domestic uses of land or by
the natural condition of the land. This limitation is explicit in
the cases involving drownings in private ponds. In two cases of
this type, the court held that the doctrine does not apply to a
pond "unless there is some unusual condition or artificial feature
other than the mere water and its location .... -21 Liability would
impose too heavy a burden on the landowner for the mere owner-
ship of land and for the activities incidental to such ownership.
Liability has not resulted from ordinary activities having a
reasonable relation to the business conducted upon the land.
Recovery was denied in cases involving railroad dump cars in a
storage yard,22 flat cars on a siding,2 3 a turntable24 and cross-ties25
Co., 130 La. 833, 58 So. 589 (1912) (hot water and steam in a gutter); Smith
v. City of Baton Rouge, 166 La. 472, 117 So. 559 (1928) (street excavation);
Fredericks v. Illinois Cent. Ry., 46 La. Ann. 1180, 15 So. 413 (1894) (culvert
over ditch between street and sidewalk); Lynch v. Knoop, 118 La. 611, 43 So.
252 (1906) (pile of lumber on public landing); and Blum v. Weatherford &
Cary Brothers, 121 La. 298, 46 So. 317 (1908) (stringers across a public canal),
the attractive nuisance doctrine was not applied as such. These cases seem-
ingly were decided on simple negligence principles. The considerations in-
fluencing the court in its decisions, however, were the same as those in-
volved in the application of the attractive nuisance doctrine to land cases.
Compare the above cases with Bordelon v. City of Shreveport, 5 La. App. 201
(1926); and Tabary v. New Orleans Public Service Comm., 142 So. 800 (La.
App. 1932), both involving ditch-digging machines left in a public street, in
which the decisions were reached on the basis of the attractive nuisance doc-
trine. In the latter case, there was no trespass or meddling by the injured
child on either land or chattels.
The language of the Louisiana Supreme Court in the recent case of Sax-
ton v. Plum Orchards Co., Inc., 215 La. 378, 40 So. (2d) 791 (1949), to the
effect that one of the requirements of the doctrine is "that there was reason
to anticipate the presence of such children, either because of some attraction
on the premises, or because the danger was in some place where children
had a right to be," indicates that the attractive nuisance doctrine might not
be restricted to trespasses upon land, but may be extended by the court to
technical trespasses upon chattels in public places.
21. McKenna v. City of Shreveport, 133 So. 524, 526 (La. App. 1931);
Peters v. Town of Ruston, 167 So. 491, 493 (La. App. 1936).
22. O'Connor v. Illinois Cent. Ry., 44 La. Ann. 339, 10 So. 678 (1892).
23. Savage v. Tremont Lumber Co., 3 La. App. 704 (1926).
24. Hendricks v. Kansas City Southern Ry., 142 La. 499, 77 So. 130 (1917).
25. Buchanan v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 119 So. 703 (La. App. 1929).
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on railroad rights of way, an elevator in an office building,26 a pile
of saw-logs on property belonging to a saw-mill,27 an electrical
sub-station in a residential area,28 and a pond in a city park.
2 9
Liability has been imposed, however, in two cases, one involving
a pond 30 and one leaking gas, 31 in which the injuring agencies
were not contributing to any economic activity on the land.
In two cases involving ponds, McKenna v. City of Shreve-
port32 and Peters v. Town of Ruston,33 the courts emphasized the
necessity that the risk involved be great, by insisting that the
peril be unknown, concealed, or hidden. The analogy here to the
liability imposed for injuries caused licensees by "traps ' 34 is
obvious. But it is believed that the court stressed the element of
hidden peril in order to preclude recovery when the injured child
actually appreciated the danger, and was not purporting to lay
down a literal requirement of concealment. In both cases, the
court pointed out that the danger of drowning is apparent to chil-
dren of even the tenderest years.
In order to emphasize the degree of danger that must be
created in order to impose liability under the attractive nuisance
doctrine, the Louisiana courts have talked in terms of conditions
which are "peculiarly dangerous to children" or "per se of a dan-
gerous nature with respect to children of tender years, '35 or "ex-
tremely dangerous. '36 But the cases indicate that the more im-
portant consideration is the use to which the injuring instrumen-
tality is put by the property owner. The unusual nature of the
activity and its apparent lack of usefulness are strong factors
favoring recovery.
(2) There must be a strong reason to anticipate the presence
of children and their probable injury.
The Louisiana courts require a high degree of attractiveness
and hence an unusual likelihood of trespass by children. They
seem to insist (1) that the injuring instrumentality must be of
such a nature that it will attract children and (2) that it must, in
fact, attract the injured child to it.
26. Marquette v. Cangelosi, 148 So. 88 (La. App. 1933).
27. Peters v. Pierce, 146 La. 902, 84 So. 198 (1920).
28. McDonald v. Shreveport Rys., 174 La. 1023, 142 So. 252 (1932).
29. Peters v. Town of Ruston, 167 So. 491 (La. App. 1936).
30. Saxton v. Plum Orchards, Inc., 215 La. 378, 40 So.(2d) 791 (1949).
31. Jackson v. Texas Company, 143 La. 21, 78 So. 137 (1918).
32. 133 So. 524 (La. App. 1931).
33. 167 So. 491 (La. App. 1936).
34. See note 11, .supra.
35. See note 21, supra.
36. Jackson v. Texas Company, 143 La. 21, 78 So. 137 (1918).
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In Tomlinson v. Vicksburg, Shreveport & Pacific Railway
Company,8 7 two infant children went upon defendant's land and
played upon a pile of cross ties. One child dislodged a cross tie,
causing it to fall upon the other. The court pointed out the un-
usual degree of attractiveness required in order for the attrac-
tive nuisance doctrine to be applicable:
"Almost any object that a little child can climb or play upon
is tempting to him, and almost any such object that is not
intended for a child to climb or play upon is dangerous for
him to climb or play upon.... The doctrine of responsibility
for having on one's premises an inviting or attractive danger
to children must be.. . confined to cases where the dangerous
agency is so obviously tempting to children that the owner
is guilty of negligence for failing to observe and guard against
the temptation and danger."
' 3
The Peters case3 9 held that the condition or agency must be
"unusually" or "peculiarly" attractive and alluring to children in
order for the attractive nuisance doctrine to apply.
The nearness of the dangerous instrumentality to a public
place increases the chance that children will come into contact
with it, thus increasing the degree of care required to guard
against injury. In Jackson v. Texas Co.,40 a six-year-old girl was
burned when her playmate lighted a match over a leak in defend-
ant's gas pipe line. The leak had existed for several months prior
to the accident and had been ignited frequently by children in
order to amuse themselves. The court commented that "nothing
more attractive to children could have been devised." In allowing
recovery, the court laid particular emphasis on the fact that the
flames from the leak were located six to ten feet from a public
path.41
Saxton v. Plum Orchards42 involved the drowning of a four-
37. 143 La. 641, 79 So. 174 (1918).
38. The application of this test in the subsequent case of Peters v. Pierce,
146 La. 902, 84 So. 198 (1920) (pile of saw logs) and in Marquette v. Can-
gelosi, 148 So. 88 (La. App. 1933) (office building elevator), resulted in a denial
of recovery in both instances.
39. Peters v. Town of Ruston, 167 So. 491 (La. App. 1936).
40. 143 La. 21, 78 So. 137 (1918).
41. An alternative basis for recovery in this case could have been the
duty that a landowner owes to users of adjacent highways. This duty has
been extended to protect children who tend to stray from the public road.
Restatement, Torts (1934) § 368; Prosser, op. cit. supra note 1, at 603. The
spot at which the leak occurred was as much open to the public as was the
path and "was commonly believed to be, and used as, had the appearance of,
and bore no signs to indicate it was not, a public highway."
42..215 La. 378, 40 So.(2d) 791 (1949).
1950]
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year-old girl in an artificial pond that had outlived its usefulness
in the residential area in which it was located. The supreme court
reversed the decisions of the lower courts and gave judgment for
plaintiff, stressing, inter alia, that the dangerous pond was read-
ily accessible and clearly visible from the nearby streets and
dwellings.
The court in Fincher v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Rail-
way Company43 held that the attractive nuisance doctrine would
not apply to a pond unless it were situated so as to attract chil-
dren from the safe place where they have a right to be and are
likely to be and induce them to enter the premises where the
attraction is in order to meddle or play with it. However, it is
believed that the court was only applying a strict test of fore-
seeability. The court appeared to be saying that unless the dan-
gerous condition is within view of a public place, where chil-
dren usually are, the possibility of its causing injury to such chil-
dren ,is not great enough to create a duty in the landowner to
protect against the danger.44 The court noted that the danger of
a drowning had never occurred to anyone, although the pool, a
part of the drainage system of the town of Jonesboro, had existed
for a long time.
In view of the fact that the cases after the Fincher case have
all involved conditions apparently visible from a position off the
premises, 45 the supreme court has not had another occasion to
apply or reject this requirement. However, the language of the
court in the Saxton case, in discussing the Fincher case, indicates
that it may be re-applied in an appropriate case. If the supreme
43. 143 'La. 164, 78 So. 433 (1918).
44. It is noteworthy that this severe limitation, the same one as applied
later by the United States Supreme Court in United Zinc & Chemical Co. v.
Britt, 258 U.S. 268, 42 S. Ct. 299, 66 L.Ed. 615, 36 A.L.R. 28 (1921), was ap-
plied in a case in which the injuring condition was a body of water. The
Louisiana courts have been extremely reluctant to allow recovery in such
cases, and have emphasized the practical necessity for canals, ponds, and
drainage ditches, their widespread use in Louisiana, the purpose they serve,
and the burden that would be placed on landowners if their maintenance
were to constitute a negligence.
45. Tomlinson v. Vicksburg, S. & P. Ry., 143 La. 641, 79 So. 174 (1918)
(cross-ties stacked "by the side of a ... public highway"); Peters v. Pierce,
146 La. 902, 84 So. 198 (1920) (saw-logs piled "adjacent to the road"); Savage
v. Tremont Lumber Co., 3 La. App. 704 (1926) (flat cars near a public cross-
ing); Buchanan v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 119 So. 703 (La. App. 1929) (cross-
ties near a path on a railroad right of way); McKenna v. City of Shreve-
port, 133 So. 524 (La. App. 1931) (pond of water on city lot); McDonald
v. Shreveport Rys., 174 La. 1023, 142 So. 252 (1932) (electrical substation on
back of empty city lot); Marquette v. Cangelosi, 148 So. 88 (La. App. 1933)
(elevator visible from the street); Peters v. Town of Ruston, 167 So. 491
(La. App. 1936) (pond visible from public road); Saxton v. Plum Orchards,
Inc., 215 La. 378, 40 So.(2d) 791 (1949) (pond visible from public roads).
[VOL. X
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court does follow this rule literally and require that the injuring
object must attract the child from a place not on the premises, it
will restrict still further the application of the attractive nuisance
doctrine in this state.
In two cases, 46 recovery was denied specifically on the ground
that the injuring agency had not, in fact, attracted the child to it.
In one, involving a railroad turntable, 47 the danger was said to be
negligible. In the other,48 a boy touched defendant's power line
when he accidentally fell out of a tree which had no connection
with the electric wires. This view is narrower than that of most
American jurisdictions, in which the "attraction" element is used
merely as a judicial method of controlling the application of the
attractive nuisance doctrine.
(3) The usefulness of the injuring activity or condition must
be relatively small as compared with the danger created toward
young children by its maintenance upon privately owned land.
Railroad property of all kinds is naturally attractive and
dangerous to children. As a result, cases which involve tres-
passes by children on such property 49 have been a fertile field for
the urging of the attractive nuisance doctrine. Except in one ques-
tionable decision,50 the Louisiana courts have consistently held
the attractive nuisance doctrine to be inapplicable to railroad
46. Hendricks v. Kansas City Southern Ry., 142 La. 499, 77 So. 130 (1917);
Fuscia v. Central Light and Power Co., 2 La. App. 195 (1925).
47. Hendricks v. Kansas City Southern Ry., 142 La. 499, 77 So. 130 (1917).
48. Fuscia v. Central Light & Power Co., 2 La. App. 195 (1925).
49. Reary v. The Louisville, N.O. & Tex. Ry., 40 La. Ann. 32, 3 So. 390,
8 Am. St. Rep. 497 (1888); O'Connor v. Illinois Cent. Ry., 44 La. Ann. 339, 10
So. 678 (1892); Spizale v. Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co., 128 La. 187, 54 So. 714
(1911); Hendricks v. Kansas City So. Ry., 142 La. 499, 77 So. 130 (1917);
Fincher v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 143 La. 164, 78 So. 433 (1918); Tomlinson
v. Vicksburg, S. & P. Ry., 143 La. 641, 79 So. 174 (1918); Savage v. Tremont
Lumber Co., 3 La. App. 704 (1926); Buchanan v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 119
So. 703 (La. App. 1929).
50. Friedman's Estate v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 209 La. 540, 25 So.(2d) 88,
163 A.L.R. 1228 (1945), in which cattle wandered onto a non-fenced rajlroad
right of way and trestle and were struck by a train. The trestle and ap-
proaching train were treated as "something in the nature of a trap." The
attractive nuisance doctrine was held applicable, in spite of the fact that
La. Acts 110, § 3 and 70, § 1, of 1886 [La. R.S. (1950) 45:504, 45:503] imposed
upon the non-fencing railroads the duty of using reasonable care toward
trespassing cattle. Here was established, by legislative flat, the same duty
of care that the courts established through the use of the attractive nuisance
doctrine. See Malone, The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1945-1946 Term (1947) 7 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw 249, and Note (1946) 20 Tulane
L. Rev. 612 for criticisms of this needless application of the attractive
nuisance doctrine.
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property. The courts have reiterated that railroads owe to chil-
dren no greater duty of care than is owed to adults.
51
This careful restriction on the imposition of liability is sup-
ported by strong practical and economic considerations. Imposifig
liability under the doctrine would subject railroads to the prohi-
bitive cost of attempting the almost impossible task of making
hundreds of miles of tracks, switch-yards, and other rights of
way inaccessible to small children. The inability of the railroads
to render vital transport service without the use of such equip-
ment may well justify the cost to society resulting from the
operation of equipment admittedly attractive and dangerous to
children.
The Louisiana Supreme Court refused to apply the attractive
nuisance doctrine to electrical equipment in the one case in which
the point was squarely presented.5 2 The court declared that elec-
trical equipment operated in the customary manner on private
property is not considered as an attractive nuisance. Probably the
most important factor in the case was that extensive precautions
had been taken to protect against the danger. However, the valu-
able service which such equipment renders and the absolute
necessity of maintaining it in highly populated districts, in spite
of its obvious danger to children, were strong factors influencing
the court in its decision.
In marked contrast are the cases in which recovery has been
allowed under the doctrine. The escaping gas in the Jackson
case, 53 which continued over a period of months and created an
extremely dangerous condition in a semi-public place, had no use-
fulness at all. The dangerous pool in the Saxton case,5 4 located in
the heart of a residential subdivision, had long since become use-
less as a drainage ditch and was "serving no useful purpose."
(4) The burden on the landowner to guard against the dan-
ger or to remove the source of the danger must not be too great.
The extent of the precautions required depends in a large
measure on the benefit resulting to the community from the dan-
gerous agency and the effect that a burden of protection would
have on a socially desirable business carried on by the land-
owner.
51. See Note (1943) 5 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 342, distinguishing the duty
owed trespassing infants from that owed habitual trespassers over a limited
area of a railroad right of way.
52. McDonald v. Shreveport Rys., 174 La. 1023, 142 So. 252 (1932).
53. 143 La. 164, 78 So. 433 (1918).
54. 215 La. 378, 40 So.(2d) 791 (1949).
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A railroad company that repeatedly patched its fence around
a storage yard was held to have exercised due care.55 Where the
danger from a turntable on a railroad right of way was negli-
gible, the railroad owed no duty to the public to fence its right
of way or to warn the public away from the turntable.56 Protec-
tive measures which included warning signs, a seven-foot fence
topped with barbed wire, locked gates, and high power lines
eighteen feet above the ground were held to be sufficient protec-
tion for electrical equipment within the enclosure. 7
The courts have repeatedly emphasized the inability of the
landowner to guard against the danger of drowning without
considerable expense:
"To hold an owner of real estate, upon which there is a body
of water, liable for accidents that may happen to children
while trespassing thereon, would be to place upon them an
unfair burden. The danger is one which cannot be guarded
against without considerable expense or inconvenience.. ..",8
This consideration has led most jurisdictions to adopt the
rule that ponds are not attractive nuisances.5 9 Because of the
topography of Louisiana and the resulting usefulness of the many
drainage ditches and canals throughout the state, the Louisiana
courts have been very reluctant to impose a burden of protection
on the landowner. The risk is an overspreading one which must
be absorbed by society as a whole. But the supreme court has
refused to apply the majority view as an unvarying rule.6 0 In the
recent Saxton case 6l recovery was allowed for the drowning of a
child in a pond that was serving no useful purpose whatever. The
defendant had done nothing to protect the numerous children in
the neighborhood during the two years the pool had existed. This
was in spite of the fact that the dangerous condition could have
been remedied easily, as was done shortly after the accident, by
simply filling in the pond.
55. O'Connor v. Illinois Cent. Ry., 44 La. Ann. 339, 10 So. 678 (1892).
56. Hendricks v. Kansas City Southern Ry., 142 La. 499, 77 So. 130 (1917).
57. McDonald v. Shreveport Rys., 174 La. 1023, 142 So. 252 (1932).
58. Sullivan v. Huidekoper, 27 App. D.C. 154, 5 L.R.A. (N.S.) 263, 7 Ann.
Cas. 196 (1906), quoted with approval in McKenna v. City of Shreveport,
133 So. 524 (La. App. 1931).
59. See Note (1925) 36 A.L.R. 224-237. But one recent Texas case, Banker
v. McLaughlin, 208 S.W.(2d) 843(Tex. 1948), reinstated the doctrine of Sioux
City Ry. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657, 21 L.Ed. 745 (1873) in Texas. The court held
a landowner liable under simple negligence principles.
60. Saxton v. Plum Orchards, Inc., 215 La. 378, 40 So.(2d) 791 (1949).
61. Ibid.
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In the Jackson case 62 the highly dangerous leak in the gas
line could have been repaired with little inconvenience and at a
nominal cost.
(5) The injured child must be very young.
The attractive nuisance doctrine is predicated upon society's
interest in protecting those of its members who are incapable of
protecting themselves. Consequently, if the child is capable of
appreciating the danger to which he exposes himself, the doctrine
can have no application. Although each case must be viewed in
the light of the particular danger involved, it is generally held,
as a matter of law, that a child under the age of seven cannot be
contributorily negligent.65 However, testimony concerning the
child's intelligence and mental capacity is admissible for the
court's consideration in determining whether the child did, in
fact, understand the dangerous nature of his act.64
The oldest child to recover under the attractive nuisance
doctrine in Louisiana was a six-year-old girl,6" whose injuries
resulted from a highly dangerous, invisible, and inoderous gas.66
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62. Jackson v. Texas Company, 143 La. 21, 78 So. 137 (1918).
63. Williams v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 155 La. 349, 99 So. 286 (1924); Hunt
v. Rundle, 120 So. 696 (La. App. 1929); Palermo v. Orleans Ice Mfg. Co., 130
La. 833, 58 So. 589, 40 L.R.A. (N.S.) 671 (1912).
64. Westerfield v. Levis Brothers, 43 La. Ann.. 63, 9 So. 52 (1891); Mar-
quette v. Cangelosi, 148 So. 88(La. App. 1933).
65. Jackson v. Texas Company, 143 La. 21, 78 So. 137 (1918).
66. Three courts of appeal cases decided subsequent to the writing of this
comment tend to substantiate the views expressed therein.
In Browne v. Rosenfield's, Inc., 42 So. (2d) 885 (La. App. 1949), a de-
partment store was held not liable for injuries sustained by a 6 year old
boy while riding an escalator in defendant store. The court noted that
escalators are a very convenient and necessary means of carrying on the
business of a modern department store, and that "that an important con-
sideration is to be given to the use that is made of the instrumentality in
order to classify it as an attractive nuisance or not. . . .' The tendency of
the courts is to exclude from the application of the attractive nuisance doc-
trine . . . natural conditions, common or ordinary objects such as walls,
fences and gates, simple tools and appliances and conditions arising from
the ordinary conduct of a business.' " (42 So.(2d) 885, 887).
Watts v. Murray, 43 So. (2d) 303 (La. App. 1949), held that a cause of
action was stated in a petition that alleged that a sixteen-months old child,
while wading in a shallow ditch alongside a gravel plantation road that chil-
dren were accustomed to using, was attracted to and drowned in a water-
filled cement vat on defendant's land 10 feet from the road. Although a calf
had previously drowned in it, defendant had taken no action to guard
against a similar accident. The court particularly stressed the "unusual
or artificial feature" of the vat and the complete inability of the child to
comprehend the danger involved, even though it was not concealed or hid-
den.
In Whitfield v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, 43 So. (2d) 47
(La. App. 1949), defendant was held not liable for the drowning during the
recess period of a seven-year old school boy in a natural drainage ditch
